THIRD PERSON EFFECT

Research indicates "abundant support" for third-person perception (Perloff,
1993, p. 167; see Gunther & Hwa, 1996; Lasorsa, 1992; Perloff, 1996;
Stenbjerre & Leets, 1997). At least two studies indicated that more than 90%
of respondents perceived greater media impact on others than on themselves
(Paxton, 1995; Tiedge, Silverblatt, Havice, & Rosenfield, 1991). As a result, they believe that they are largely unaffected by media messages, even when they are influenced. This tendency may result in seeing oneself as particularly discerning about biased media messages while perceiving others as unduly vulnerable to biased messages.
In forming and expressing their own opinions, people often consider the
opinions of others. An uncertain voter, for example, may decide to go along
with his impression of the majority view. A passenger on a plane may not voice
her own opinion because she thinks those around her would disagree. Many such
consequences of perceived public opinion have been documented in empirical
research (see, e.g., Henshel & Johnston, 1987; Noelle-Neumann, 1977).
Mass media constitute the major source of reference for information about the
distribution of opinion" and that "the `powerful effect' assigned to mass
communication is a subtle one. The media are not perceived as agents of direct
influence, but rather as reporters on the distribution of(acceptable) opinion. In other words, people assume that what the media is saying today must be what the public will be thinking tomorrow.
People can easily form an idea of what others are thinking by inferring
it from the information they think others are getting. And this inference is a
comfortable strategy because it is an autonomous one. Like any inference, it
is a conclusion people come to themselves, rather than a fact they receive
from others.
In spite of the many reasons people may have for making such an inference,
we know from a multitude of data and the theoretical ideas discussed above
that people are susceptible to misjudgments about prevailing opinions. Indeed,
the literature defining pluralistic ignorance (Merton, 1968; O'Gorman, 1975)
is founded on such inaccurate perceptions of public beliefs. Many perceptual
errors can be linked to a well-documented human inclination to simplify
judgments by using intuitive tools, or mental shortcuts (Kahneman, Slovik, &
Tversky, 1982). These everyday shortcuts require less mental effort and allow
for simplified thinking, but as a consequence they are prone to error(Spin?).
The most influential cue of all is internal: one's own personal opinion.
Research demonstrates that for a gauge of the opinions of others people
commonly rely on their own opinions, projecting them onto the public mind.
Story slant does have a significant influence on estimations of public opinion and
perceived opinion is indirectly affected by slant via personal opinion. Thus
people infer public opinion from their own reading of media coverage. But more to the point, slant of news coverage exerts a consistent and independent influence on perceptions of opinion--an important test of the tenacity of the persuasive press